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MULTISTATE CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS IN ILLINOIS
KENNETH P. Ross*
During the last decade, the state of Illinois enacted substantive and
procedural statutes to effectuate a policy of meaningful consumer pro-
tection. In 1973, the legislature enacted the Illinois Consumer Fraud
and Deceptive Business Practices Act,' known affectionately to con-
sumerists as the "Little FTC Act." This act prohibits all "unfair meth-
ods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices ' 2 and
protects "consumers and borrowers and businessmen against fraud, un-
fair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
the conduct of any trade or commerce. . .. -3 Courts have recognized
the Consumer Fraud Act as "a clear mandate from the legislature to
the courts to use the Consumer Fraud Act to the utmost degree to erad-
icate all forms of deceptive and unfair business practices."'4 The Con-
sumer Fraud Act gave, for the first time, a private right of action to
consumers to remedy a broad range of deceptive, fraudulent and unfair
acts committed by those who do business in the state of Illinois.5
Four years later, with the enactment of the Illinois class action
statute,6 the legislature gave the Consumer Fraud Act procedural teeth.
In essence, the statute did away with some archaic procedural stum-
bling blocks inherent in class actions brought under Illinois common
law. Gone were the old requirements of a "common fund"7 and a
* B.A., University of Wisconsin; J.D., Northeastern University School of Law, Boston,
Massachusetts. The author is currently associated with the law firm of Freeman, Atkins & Cole-
man, Ltd., Chicago, Illinois, and is an Instructor of Law at lIT/Chicago Kent College of Law. The
author is grateful to Robert E. Williams for his research and Robert S. Atkins, Esq., for sharing
his persistence, ideas and innovations in the areas of consumer protection and class actions.
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 , §§ 261-272 (1979).
2. Id. § 262. See Fitzgerald v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 72 II. 2d 179, 380 N.E.2d 790
(1978).
3. Preamble, P.A. 78-904, § I, effective October 1, 1973.
4. Perlman v. Time, Inc., 64 Ill. App. 3d 190, 198, 380 N.E.2d 1040, 1047 (1978), citing
American Buyers Club of Mt. Vernon, Illinois, Inc. v. Hayes, 46 Ill. App. 3d 270, 271, 361 N.E.2d
1383, 1384 (1977).
5. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 , § 270a(a) (1979) provides:
Any person who suffers damage as a result of a violation of Section 2 through 2N of this
Act [ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 , §§ 262-262N (1979)] committed by any other person may
bring an action against such person. The court in its discretion may award actual dam-
ages or any other relief which the court deems proper.
6. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 57.2-57.7 (1979).
7. See, e.g., Peoples Stores of Roseland v. McKibbin, 379 Ill. 148, 39 N.E.2d 995 (1942).
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"community of interest." 8 The statute also eradicated confusing varia-
tions among the cases which provided the common law basis for the
action. 9 In the words of the late Justice Dooley, "[w]ith the advent of
the statute many of the prior decisions have become corpses."' 0 The
Illinois class action statute has been called a procedural device superior
to its federal counterpart. "
The legal community finds the plaintiff class action the single most
important procedural device for the protection of consumers. 12 In the
context of consumer protection, the class action serves at least two pri-
mary interests. First, a class action has the obvious effect of reducing
the costs of litigation in relation to the potential recovery to the class
and of the individual class member. As the class gets larger in number,
thepro rata share of the costs of bringing the action diminishes for each
member of the plaintiff class. Second, the threat of recoveries by large
classes of disgruntled customers acts as a strong deterrent to fraudulent
conduct by manufacturers, distributors and retailers. 
13
While injured consumers have a potent weapon in the class action,
8. See, e.g., Harrison Sheet Steel Co. v. Lyons, 15 I11. 2d 532, 538, 155 N.E.2d 595, 598
(1959); Smyth v. Kaspar Am. State Bank, 9 11. 2d 27, 44, 136 N.E.2d 796, 805 (1956).
9. See Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 69 111. 2d 320, 338, 371 N.E.2d 634, 643 (1977).
10. Id.
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 23. See Note, Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions." Jurisdiction and Certifica-
tion, 92 HARV. L. REV. 718, n.8 (1979).
12. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 69 111. 2d 320, 334-35, 371 N.E.2d 634,
641-42 (1977); Adams v. Jewel Companies, Inc., 63 Ill. 2d 336, 347, 348 N.E.2d 161, 167 (1976);
Smith v. Kaspar Am. State Bank, 9 111. 2d 27, 44, 136 N.E.2d 796, 805 (1956); Eckhardt, Consumer
Class Actions, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 663 (1970); Starrs, The Consumer ClassAction - Part 11, 49
B.U.L. REV. 407 (1969); Z. CHAFFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 199-242 (1950). In Hoover v.
May Dep't Stores Co., 62 I11. App. 3d 106, 378 N.E.2d 762, (1978), rev'don other grounds, 77 Ill.
2d 93, 395 N.E.2d 541 (1979), the court noted:
Class actions are particularly alluring in the area of consumer protection since it is often
the case that the situations presented are ones where individual litigation of the underly-
ing dispute is not feasible, usually because the costs of litigation greatly exceed the value
of the potential relief which could be awarded.
To consumerists, the consumer class action is an inviting procedural device to cope
with frauds causing small damages to large groups. The slight loss to the individual,
when aggregated in the coffers of the wrongdoer, results in gains which are both hand-
some and tempting. The alternatives to the class action-private suits or governmental
actions-have been so often found so wanting in controlling consumer frauds that not
even the ardent critics of class actions seriously contend that they are truly effective. The
consumer class action, when brought by those who have no other avenue of legal redress,
provides restitution to the injured, and deterrence of the wrongdoer.
Id. at 112, 395 N.E.2d at 768, citing Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft," Con-
sumer ClassActions andthe Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CALIF. L. REV. 842, 845 (1974).
13. Arguably, the most positive result of class actions is the deterrent effect they have on
the harmful practices sometimes employed by manufacturers and retailers of consumer
goods. . . . Concerned that a class action could be brought, the producer of consumer
goods would undoubtedly be more sensitive to possible areas of liability.
Comment, Expanding the Impact of State Court Class Action Adjudications to Provide an Effective
Forumfor Consumers, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1002, 1021-22 (1977) (citations omitted).
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there is a question whether they have any viable forum in which to
exercise the device. For all practical purposes, the consumer class ac-
tion is shut out of federal court: "The promise of the federal class ac-
tion was nipped in the bud by the unfortunate decision in Snyder v.
Harris."'14 In Snyder, 15 the Supreme Court held that class members
could not aggregate their separate and distinct claims in order to satisfy
the $10,000 amount in controversy requirement of federal law.' 6 In
Zahn v. International Paper Co., 17 the Court expanded the holding in
Snyder by requiring each member of a plaintiff class to have a separate
and distinct claim for the requisite jurisdictional amount.
Consumers' claims would rarely exceed $10,000 for each member
of a putative plaintiff class. Hence, "if the great majority of consumer
classes are to find a forum, it must be the state courts."' 8 Despite its
holding, the Snyder Court left a ray of hope to litigants involved in
consumer class claims. Specifically addressing class actions, the Court
itself suggested that "[s]uits involving issues of state law and brought
on the basis of diversity of citizenship can often be most appropriately
tried in state courts."' 9
Illinois courts have shown their willingness to entertain the typi-
cally small claim of an individual consumer in a class action. In the
recent case of Miner v. Gillette Co. ,20 the court rejected the defendant's
argument that the $7.95 claims of the individual class members were de
minimus and not appropriate for class treatment. The court noted "[aill
section 57.2(a)(4) of the Civil Practice Act requires is that 'the class
action is an appropriate method for the fair and efficient adjudication
of the controversy.' "21 Many classes in Illinois have been approved
where the amounts to be recovered by individual class members are
small. In Moseid v. McDonough ,22 for example, the court affirmed a
class certification where the plaintiff challenged the authority of the
Clerk of the Circuit Court to charge a one-dollar county law library fee
to each defendant filing an appearance in civil cases.23
14. Hearings on S. 3201 Before the Consumer Subcommittee on Consumer Protection of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1977).
15. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
16. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
17. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
18. Comment, Consumer Class Actions with a Multistate Class.- A Problem of Jurisdiction, 25
HASTINGS L.J. 1411, 1423 (1974).
19. 394 U.S. at 341.
20. 89 I11. App. 3d 315, 320, 411 N.E.2d 1092, 1097 (1980).
21. Id. at 320, 411 N.E.2d at 1097.
22. 103 I11. App. 2d 23, 243 N.E.2d 394 (1968).
23. More recent Illinois cases, decided under the new class action statute, have also allowed
classes to be certified where individual recoveries were relatively small. See Barliant v. Follett
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Since the enactment of the class action statute the trial courts of
the state of Illinois became an ideal forum in which to bring the type of
suit contemplated by Snyder. 24 Nevertheless, since the enactment of
the statute, the lower appellate courts of Illinois have split on the ques-
tion of whether to enhance the effectiveness of the consumer class ac-
tion by allowing a plaintiff class to include persons who are not
residents of the state of Illinois. 25 Three reported cases in the last three
years have addressed the question of whether due process or the class
action statute allow multistate plaintiff class actions in the state courts
of Illinois.
This article will contend that nothing in the due process clause or
the Illinois class action statute prohibits Illinois courts from entertain-
ing a plaintiff class action comprised of both Illinois and non-Illinois
residents. Admittedly, this article takes the particular position of a
plaintiffs class counsel, 26 and that position has yet to be tested in the
Supreme Court of Illinois. 27 With that point in mind, this article will
first discuss the multistate plaintiff class actions brought in Illinois
prior and subsequent to the effective date of the Illinois class action
statute. It will then be shown that procedural due process, rather than
notions of territoriality, is the constitutional touchstone by which state
courts may exercise jurisdiction over nonresident members of a plaintiff
class. Finally, it will be shown that the new Illinois class action statute
allows the trial courts of Illinois to hear and resolve multistate con-
sumer class actions.
HISTORY OF MULTISTATE CLASS ACTION IN ILLINOIS
Prior to the enactment of sections 57.2-.7 of the Civil Practice
Act,28 multistate class actions were consistently allowed by Illinois
Corp., 74 111. 2d 226, 384 N.E.2d 316 (1979) ($15 freight overcharge); Hoover v. May Dep't Stores
Co., 62 11. App. 3d 106, 378 N.E.2d 762 (1978) (average claim of $20); Perlman v. Time, Inc., 64
I11. App. 3d 190, 380 N.E.2d 1040 (1978) (claims of class members for value of remainder of
magazine subscriptions were $9 or less); Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 69 I11. 2d 320, 371
N.E.2d 634 (1977) ($15 admission fee).
24. 394 U.S. at 341.
25. Compare Hoover v. May Dep't Stores Co., 62 Ill. App. 3d 106, 378 N.E.2d 761 (1978),
with Spirek v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 Ill. App. 3d 440, 382 N.E.2d 111 (1978), and
Miner v. Gillette Co., 89 I11. App. 3d 315, 411 N.E.2d 1092 (1980).
26. In the interest of full disclosure (see Douglas, Law Reviews and Full Disclosure, 40 WASH.
L. REV. 227 (1965)), the author wishes to point out that he is associated with one of the two law
firms who represent the plaintiff class in Miner.
27. Leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court was filed in Miner on November 26, 1980
and has been granted. Miner v. Gillette Co., appeal granted, No. 54211 (111. Jan. 30, 1981).
28. See note 6 supra.
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courts. 29 Kimbrough v. Parker30 provides an example of the treatment
of a multistate class action under the now defunct "community of inter-
est" doctrine, a substantially more restrictive standard than any re-
quired by the new statute. In that case, the defendants sponsored a
puzzle contest through newspaper advertisements which induced mem-
bers of the public to enter the contest believing that prizes would be
offered. In fact, the defendants had never intended to honor their repre-
sentations to the public. To enter the contest, the 3,300 resident and
nonresident members of the plaintiff class were required to pay up to
twelve dollars as a donation. The nonresident composition of the class
was never an issue before the Kimbrough court. Regardless, the court
sustained the class, noting a predominance of common factual and le-
gal issues:
The inducements were substantially the same for all contestants since
there were no personal solicitations. The issues between all contes-
tants and defendants are the same. There are no actual or potential
conflicts of interest. The 5 plaintiffs are fairly representative and
have fairly presented contestants' side of the common issues.3'
Although the actions were brought prior to the effective date of the
new class action statute, the courts in Spirek v. State Farm MutualAuto-
mobile Insurance Co. 32 and Hoover v. May Department Stores Co. 33
applied the standards of the statute to deny and grant, respectively,
multistate class actions. In Hoover, a class of customers of the defend-
ant, which had stores in both Illinois and Missouri, brought a class ac-
tion to challenge the department store chain's policy of denying trading
stamps to those customers who neither pay in cash nor pay the entire
balance of their charge accounts before the next billing date. The
plaintiff class was comprised of both Illinois and Missouri residents.
29. See Van Vactor v. Blue Cross Ass'n, 50 111. App. 3d 709, 365 N.E.2d 638 (1977); Frank v.
Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am., 47 Ill. App. 3d 821, 365 N.E.2d 28 (1977), rev'don other
grounds, 71 111. 2d 583, 376 N.E.2d 1377 (1978); Kimbrough v. Parker, 344 I11. App. 483, 101
N.E.2d 617 (1951); Weislow v. Packard, No. 78 CH 1906 (Cir. Ct. Cook County); Holstein v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., No. 68 CH 275 (Cir. Ct. Cook County 1970). But see Reardon v. Ford
Motor Co., 7 111. App. 3d 338, 287 N.E.2d 519 (1972). In Reardon, three named plaintiffs filed an
action on behalf of approximtely 4,000,000 individual present or past owners of certain Ford
automobiles. The court, relying on principles since modified by the enactment of section 57.2,
found that the plaintiff class lacked a "community of interest." The court dismissed the entire
class action and did not differentiate between the resident and nonresident members. It should be
noted, however, that a class of 4,000,000 unknown, unidentified members would likely never meet
the standard of section 57.2(a)(4), which requires that a "class action is an appropriate method for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy."
30. 344 I11. App. 483, 101 N.E.2d 617 (1951).
31. Id. at 486, 101 N.E.2d at 618.
32. 65 111. App. 3d 440, 382 N.E.2d 111 (1978).
33. 62 Ill. App. 3d 106, 378 N.E.2d 762 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 77 Ill. 2d 93, 395
N.E.2d 541 (1979).
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Their two-count complaint alleged violations of both the Illinois Retail
Installment Sales Act 34 and the Missouri Retail Credit Sales Act.35 The
court noted that the class likely contained hundreds of thousands of
members and that the average claim of each member was about twenty
dollars. In determining the propriety of a class composed of seventy-
five percent non-Illinois residents, the court turned to the new statute to
"lend. . . guidance as to what weight should be accorded to the previ-
ous case law."' 36 The court allowed the action to proceed as a class
action, noting: "[I]t becomes apparent that it would be unjust and arbi-
trary to allow the fortuitous location of a river and a state line through
defendants' area of operation and the area from which it draws its cus-
tomers to dictate which customers, uniformly affected by defendant's
policy, can be class members. ' 37 Conspicuously absent from the Hoo-
ver court's opinion was any analysis of the binding effect of a judgment
rendered in that case on the Missouri members of the class.
In contrast, the binding effect of a judgment on nonresident mem-
bers of a multistate class was the primary concern of the court in Spirek
v. State Farm MutualAutomobile Insurance Co. 3s In that case, the two
representative plaintiffs brought a class action against the insurance
company on behalf of all insureds of State Farm who had received
medical payments under their automobile insurance policy and who
were required, as a condition to receiving their medical payments, to
execute subrogation receipts. Among the three questions certified for
appeal by the trial court was: "[D]oes the [trial] court have power in
the instant case to include nonresidents of the State of Illinois as resi-
dents [sic] of the plaintiff class?" 39
State Farm also challenged the propriety of the plaintiffs' repre-
sentation of a class comprised solely of Illinois residents. After a de-
tailed application of each of the four standards set forth in section 57.2
of the Civil Practice Act,40 the court upheld the trial court's certification
of the Illinois class. The court found first that the class was so numer-
ous as to make joinder impracticable. 41 The court noted that the sec-
ond requirement of the new statute42 "ends numerous controversies
34. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 , §§ 501-533 (1979).
35. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 408.250-408.370 (Supp. 1975).
36. 62 Il. App. 3d at 114, 378 N.E.2d at 769.
37. Id. at 115, 378 N.E.2d at 770.
38. See note 32 supra.
39. 65 Ill. App. 3d at 442, 382 N.E.2d at 113.
40. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 57.2a(1-4) (1979).
41. Id. § 57.2(a)(1).
42. Id. § 57.2(a)(2).
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under Illinois' prior common law approach to the class action," doing
away with the earlier "common fund" doctrine and modifying and sim-
plifying the requirement of a "community of interest in both the sub-
ject matter and the remedy. ' 43 Thus, the court focused on the
similarity of the insurance policies, rather than the possible dissimilar-
ity in transactions which may have occurred in collecting subrogation
for medical payments, to find common questions which predominated
over questions affecting only individual members. The court's third de-
termination in considering the propriety of the Illinois class was
whether the representative party would fairly and adequately protect
the interest of the class.44 The court found no dispute over the ade-
quacy of the representative party. Finally, the court held that the class
action "would best serve the economies of time, effort and expense and
promote the uniformity of decision and accomplish the other ends of
equity and justice sought to be attained in these actions. '45
In considering the propriety of the multistate class, however, the
Spirek court seemingly abandoned its orderly application of the four
statutory requirements and found "[tihat there is reason to doubt the
jurisdiction of an Illinois court to join as plaintiffs in a class action
persons residing in numerous other states .... ,,46 The court reached
this conclusion on the basis of three findings: (1) that due process
would be offended by, and full faith and credit would not be afforded
to, a judgment of an Illinois court binding nonresident plaintiffs; (2)
that no common question of law would predominate; and (3) that the
task of arguing the law of fifty states would render the representation of
plaintiffs' counsel inadequate.
The primary basis upon which the Spirek court rejected the plain-
tiffs' multistate class action was its conclusion that an Illinois court
could not, consistent with due process, bind out-of-state residents to
Illinois jurisdiction. In arriving at this conclusion, the court relied on
the following observation:
Although the ability of the state to subject nonresidents to its juris-
diction with or without compelling their presence has increased since
the decision in Pennoyer, the basic premise of territorial limits re-
mains in the concept of "minimum contacts" espoused in Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington. . . . The due process clause still
"does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in
personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which
43. 65 I11. App. 3d at 450, 382 N.E.2d at 118.
44. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 57.2(a)(3) (1979).
45. 65 Ill. App. 3d at 452, 382 N.E.2d at 119.
46. Id. at 454, 382 N.E.2d at 121.
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the state has not contacts, ties or relations. 47
On that basis, the court held that an Illinois court cannot render a
binding inpersonam judgment over plaintiffs who have not established
"minimum contacts" with the state of Illinois. In addition, the Spirek
court, apparently to buttress its conclusion that due process provides an
absolute bar to any multistate class action, found that the case
presented no common question of law between the nonresident mem-
bers of the plaintiff class:
Accordingly, because the plaintiffs in the case at hand come from
numerous other states, numerous other states' laws would have to be
applied. Thus, as to non-resident members of the proposed class, the
question of law which is the heart of this action would not be in
common, and would not predominate, as required by Section
57.2(a)(2) of the Civil Practice Act.48
Less than two years after Spirek, the Appellate Court for the First
Judicial District was presented with an opportunity to reexamine the
position it took in Spirek. In Miner v. Gillette Co. ,49 an interlocutory
appeal and cross-appeal were brought from the trial court's order dis-
missing a multistate class on the authority of Spirek and allowing the
case to proceed as a class action solely on behalf of Illinois residents. 50
The plaintiff in Miner brought a class action in the Circuit Court of
Cook County on behalf of a class of approximately 180,000 consumers
residing throughout the United States, who were allegedly deceived by
Gillette in connection with a nationwide campaign to promote sales of
its "Cricket" disposable butane lighters. The plaintiff alleged that Gil-
lette fraudulently induced members of the plaintiff class to purchase
thousands of Cricket lighters, while knowing its promotional offer of a
"free" Accent table lighter with the purchase of two Cricket lighters
was deceptive. Miner alleged that Gillette knew and concealed the fact
that "it did not have an adequate supply of Accent table lighters avail-
able to fill orders."5'
47. Id. at 453, 382 N.E.2d at 120, quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 319 (1945).
48. Id. at 453-54, 382 N.E.2d at 121.
49. 89 Ill. App. 3d 315, 411 N.E.2d 1092 (1980).
50. Order of September 17, 1979, Miner v. Gillette Co., 79 CH 567 (Cir. Ct. Cook County).
51. Amended Complaint, 5-13, Miner v. Gillette Co., 79 CH 567 (Cir. Ct. Cook County).
In paragraph 4 of his Amended Complaint, the plaintiff alleged:
Commencing in approximately April of 1978, defendant Gillette, for the purpose of in-
creasing sales of its Cricket butane lighter, instituted an extensive sales campaign under
which the defendant offered members of the public a "free" Accent table lighter with the
purchase of two Cricket lighters; details of the promotional offer set forth below ap-
peared on the reverse side of the display pack; a copy of both sides of the Cricket display
pack is attached hereto as Exhibit A:
Mail-in Offer Details:
404
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Having accepted Gillette's offer of a "free" Accent table lighter
(which the promotional package acknowledged had a "$7.95 Retail
Value"), and having submitted proofs of purchase of two Cricket light-
ers and payment of fifty cents, the plaintiff, on his own behalf and on
behalf of each of the approximately 180,000 members of the plaintiff
class, sought compensatory and punitive damages resulting from Gil-
lette's refusal to supply them with their "free" Accent table lighters.
The two-count complaint alleged that Gillette's conduct amounted to
an "unfair and deceptive act or practice prohibited by the Consumer
Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act,"' 52 and that Gillette's re-
fusal to comply with the terms of its offer and supply members of the
plaintiff class with their "free" Accent lighters constituted a breach of
contract. In its answer to an interrogatory propounded by the plaintiff,
Gillette attested that it had failed to fill 179,580 orders nationwide, and
that a total of 11,456 of these orders were received from residents of
Illinois. 53 The identity and address of each member of the putative
class was apparently known by Gillette.
On appeal, the court allowed the plaintiff to proceed on behalf of
the 11,456 members of the class who were residents of Illinois. The
court found, among other things, that common questions of law and
fact predominated as to the Illinois residents. Specifically, the court
found that "[a]ll Illinois plaintiff members allegedly performed in the
same manner and suffered the same injury from Gillette's failure to
perform." '54
As to the multistate class, however, the court followed its earlier
decision in Spirek and emphasized that the "minimum contacts" stan-
dard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington55 precluded the plaintiffs
representation of nonresidents:
In Spirek, two Illinois residents sought to represent all State Farm
policyholders, wherever located, who made defined medical payment
claims. We refused to exercise such jurisdiction over all plaintiffs
even though we had jurisdiction over defendant. In refusing to exer-
cise jurisdiction, we discussed a number of due process and full faith
and credit problems inherent in joining out-of-State plaintiffs: com-
pelling plaintiffs to opt out of the class suit or risk a binding in per-
sonam judgment; no common question of law would predominate;
"Purchase two Cricket lighters. Send in the words 'Cricket by Gillette' from any two
packages as your proof of purchase plus the enclosed certificate and 50¢ for postage and
handling. Gillette will mail you a FREE CRICKET ACCENT TABLE LIGHTER."
52. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 h, §§ 261-272 (1979).
53. 89 Ill. App. 3d at 316, 411 N.E.2d at 1094.
54. Id. at 320, 411 N.E.2d at 1096.
55. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
405
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numerous other States' laws would have to be applied; and any deci-
sion of the court would not be binding on persons beyond its jurisdic-
tion which would subject any judgment rendered to relitigation when
enforcement was sought in a sister State's courts.
5 6
Unlike the Spirek court, the court in Miner had before it three
recent decisions57 in which multistate class actions were allowed. Al-
though two of those decisions, Shutts v. Phillps Petroleum Co. 58 and
Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers Corp. 59 explicitly rejected the application
of a "minimum contacts" analysis to plaintff classes, and the third,
Hoover v. May Department Stores Co. ,60 did not even address the ques-
tion, the Miner court distinguished these cases as consistent with the
"minimum contacts" doctrine.6' Also in contrast to Spirek, the court in
Miner found that a common question of fact predominated over any
questions affecting only individual members as to all members of the
class.62 Nevertheless, the court determined that a multistate class ac-
tion "would entail the application of the laws of the different states."
63
The court stated that it was "not persuaded that Spirek should be over-
ruled to allow this action to proceed as a multistate class action."
64
Although Miner did not overrule Spirek, the decision implied a
retreat from the prior case's broad holding prohibiting multistate class
actions in any respect. By distinguishing Shutts and Schlosser, rather
than dismissing the authority of those decisions as decisions of foreign
courts, the Miner court indicated that it would have found "minimum
contacts" had the defendant been an Illinois corporation and had at
least some of its conduct "emanated from the home office" in Illinois.
65
56. 89 I11. App. 3d at 317, 411 N.E.2d at 1095.
57. Hoover v. May Dep't Stores Co., 62 I11. App. 3d 106, 378 N.E.2d 762 (1978); Schlosser v.
Allis-Chalmers Corp., 86 Wis. 2d 226, 271 N.W.2d 879 (1978); Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
222 Kan. 527, 567 P.2d 1292 (1977). cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1068 (1978).
58. 222 Kan. 527, 567 P.2d 1292 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1068 (1978).
59. 86 Wis. 2d 226, 271 N.W.2d 879 (1978).
60. 62 Ill. App. 3d 106, 378 N.E.2d 762 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 77 I11. 2d 93, 395
N.E.2d 541 (1979).
61. 89 Ill. App. 3d at 318, 411 N.E.2d at 1095.
62. Id. at 319, 411 N.E.2d at 1096
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 318, 411 N.E.2d at 1095. It is questionable whether there were, in fact, "minimum
contacts" in Schlosser. Had the tables been turned in that case, and had Allis-Chalmers been
suing its former employees under the same contract, it is doubtful that a Wisconsin court could
have asserted long-arm jurisdiction over the nonresident employees simply because of the con-
tract. The Schlosser court considered the presence of the defendant in Wisconsin not for "mini-
mum contacts" purposes, but to find a particular interest of Wisconsin courts in protecting
residents and nonresidents alike from the conduct of a Wisconsin corporation. 86 Wis. 2d at 239-
43, 271 N.W.2d at 885-87.
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In the aftermath of Miner, multistate class actions in Illinois are not
wholly precluded.
DUE PROCESS IMPLICATIONS OF MULTISTATE CLASS ACTIONS
The "Minimum Contacts" Doctrine
The primary obstacle to multistate class actions in Illinois, as well
as New Jersey and Pennsylvania, 66 is the natural hesitancy of state
courts to extend their jurisdiction beyond what they perceive as their
territorial limits. This obstacle was expressed well by the Spirek court:
"There is . . . no dispute that out of state residents could appear and
subject themselves to the jurisdiction of Illinois courts. However, we
find it beyond this court's authority, consistent with due process, to
force them to do so. ''67 The court based its finding on Pennoyer v.
Neff,68 in which the Supreme Court reiterated its conclusion that
"[a]ny attempt to exercise authority beyond [territorial limits of a state]
would be deemed in every other forum. . . an illegitimate assumption
of power and be resisted as mere abuse. ' 69 The Spirek court noted that
state court jurisdiction over absent parties has expanded since Pen-
noyer,70 but found nevertheless that:
[Tihe basic premise of territorial limits remains in the concept of
"minimum contacts" espoused in International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton. . . . The due process clause still "does not contemplate that a
state may make binding a judgment inpersonam against an individ-
ual or corporate defendant with which the state has not contacts, ties
or relations." 7'
With its ruling, the Spirek court took a virtually unprecedented
position. 72 The Spirek court extended the "minimum contacts" test, a
standard which has been applied exclusively to cases in which a forum
sought to exercise its jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant,73 to
nonresident members of aplaintff class.
Since Spirek, the highest courts of some sister states74 and a host of
66. See Feldman v. Bates Mfg. Co., 143 N.J. Super. 84, 362 A.2d 1177 (1976); Klemow v.
Time, Inc., 466 Pa. 189, 352 A.2d 12 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1977).
67. 65 Ill. App. 3d at 452, 382 N.E.2d at 120.
68. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
69. Id. at 720.
70. 65 111. App. 3d at 453, 382 N.E.2d at 120.
71. Id., quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (citation
omitted).
72. But see note 66 supra.
73. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See also Rush v.
Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
74. See note 57 supra.
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commentators 75 have cast considerable doubt on the extension of the
"minimum contacts" doctrine to members of a plaintiff class. 76 The
Supreme Court of Kansas recently avoided an extension of the "mini-
mum contacts" test simply by distinguishing International Shoe and its
progeny as cases which dealt only with nonresident defendants. In
Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,77 the Supreme Court of Kansas was
faced with a class action seeking to recover interest on "suspense royal-
ties" attributed to gas produced from leases in a three-state area. The
defendant did business in Kansas and the plaintiff class representative
and 218 of the approximately 6,400 members of the plaintiff class were
Kansas residents. In response to the defendant's objection to inclusion
of nonresidents in the plaintiff class, the court stated:
Whether all nonresident plaintijs in a class action are required to
have "minimum contacts" with the forum is a different matter. Be-
cause a class action must necessarily proceed in the absence of almost
every class member, we hold the residential makeup of the class
membership is not controlling. What is important is that the nonresi-
dent plaintiffs be given notice and an opportunity to be heard and that
their rights be justly protected by adequate representation. These are
the essential requirements of due process, and they must be satisfied
in any class action by every court, state or federal, regardless of the
residences of the absent class members. Therefore, while the essen-
tial element necessary to establish jurisdiction over nonresident de-
fendants is some "minimum contacts" between the defendant and
the forum state, the element necessary to the exercise of jurisdiction
75. See Comment, Multistate Plaintif' Class Actions." Jurisdiction and Certification, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 718 (1979); Comment, Toward a Policy-Based Theory of State Court Jurisdiction Over
Class Actions, 56 TEx. L. REV. 1033 (1978); Comment, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident
Plaintiqffs in Multistate Class Actions, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 382 (1978); Comment, Consumer Class
Actions with a Multistate Class.- 4 Problem of Jurisdiction, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1411 (1974).
76. Spirek, barely two years old, has itself been subject to the criticism of the Illinois legal
community. Kevin Forde, one of the drafters of the new Illinois class action statute, recently
wrote:
In Spirek v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the court held nonresident
insureds could not be included as members of the plaintiff class. Reardon v. Ford Motor
Co., has also been cited as rejecting a nation-wide class, although jurisdictional
problems concerning out-of-state class members were never presented, ruled on or dis-
cussed in that case. These decisions ignore the doctrine of class representation as a rec-
ognized substitute for in personam jurisdiction and overlook the many precedents
permitting nonresident class members to be bound in a proper class action. Spirek, for
example, relied heavily on the "territorial limitation" rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, pro-
nounced outmoded in Shaffer v. Heitner, and inapplicable in any event to the facts
before the court. Unlike Spirek, Pennoyer was not a class action. Moreover, Pennoyer
and modem cases which substituted the "minimum contacts" jurisdictional test (Interna-
tional Shoe and Shaffer, supra) dealt with nonresident defendants, not nonresident
plaintiffs.
K. FORDE, CLASS ACTIONS, 8-27 (I11. Inst. for CLE, 1979) (citations omitted).
77. Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 222 Kan. 527, 567 P.2d 1292 (1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1068 (1978).
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over nonresident plaintiff class members is procedural due process.7 8
Furthermore, the Shutts court found support in Hansberry v. Lee, 79 for
its conclusion that it is procedural due process, not strict notions of
territoriality, which must be satisfied to maintain a multistate class ac-
tion.80
Shutts has been greeted with approval by later courts and com-
mentators. 81 In Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers Corp. ,82 for example, a class
of retired, salaried nonunion employees brought an action against their
employer for breach of its contractual obligation to provide noncon-
tributory life insurance benefits to class members over the age of sixty-
five. The plaintiff class included members who resided outside the state
of Wisconsin, in twenty-one states and two countries. The defendant
contended that the maintenance of a class action involving nonresident
class members exceeded the constitutional limits of the jurisdiction of a
state court and, like the Spirek court, sought to apply the "minimum
contacts" analysis to nonresident members of the plaintiff class. In re-
sponse, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated:
In a well-reasoned opinion by the Kansas court, the court concluded
that, while contacts with the forum are necessary to establish the con-
78. Id. at 540, 567 P.2d at 1309 (emphasis in original, citation omitted).
79. 311 U.S. 32, 40-42 (1940).
80. In Hansberry, the Court stated:
It is a principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not
bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party
or to which he has not been made a party by service of process. . . . A judgment ren-
dered in such circumstances is not entitled to the full faith and credit which the Constitu-
tion and statute of the United States, . . . prescribe. . . . To these general rules there is
a recognized exception that, to an extent not precisely defined by judicial opinion, the
judgment in a "class" or "representative" suit, to which some members of the class are
parties, may bind members of the clas or those represented who were not made parties to
it.
[Clourts are not infrequently called upon to proceed with causes in which the number of
those interested in the litigation is so great as to make difficult or impossible the joinder
of all because some are not within the jurisdiction or because their whereabouts is un-
known or where if all were made parties to the suit its continued abatement by the death
of some would prevent or unduly delay a decree. In such cases where the interests of
those not joined are of the same class as the interests of those who are, and where it is
considered that the latter fairly represent the former in the prosecution of the litigation of
the issue in which all have a common interest, the court will proceed to a decree ...
311 U.S. 32, 40, 42 (1940) (emphasis added, citations omitted).
8 1. See, e.g., Comment, Civil Procedure. In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Plaintiffs
in Multistate Class Actions, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 383, 390-91 (1978), where the author stated:
With the Shutts decision the Kansas Supreme Court provides a type of forum which
previously did not exist for the plaintiff classes exemplified by Shutts. . . . The Kansas
court has now taken the first step in a new movement to provide these "small man" class
actions their day in court. Now, procedural due process is the element necessary to pro-
vide personal jurisdiction over these classes. Later decisions must provide further defini-
tions of reasonable notice and adequate representation.
82. 86 Wis. 2d 226, 271 N.W.2d 879 (1978).
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stitutional predicate for the exercise of judicial power over a defend-
ant, the due process requisites for the exercise of such power over
unnamed nonresident plaintiffs are adequate notice and representa-
tion. . . . Class actions necessarily proceed in the absence of most
class members; therefore, the validity of the judgment as to such
members should not depend on their relationship with the state but
rather it should depend on whether they had adequate notice and
opportunity to decide to submit themselves to the court's jurisdiction
and whether their interests were properly represented. 83
Important in Schlosser is the manner in which the court disposed
of Klemow v. Time, Inc.8 4 and Feldman v. Bates Manufacturing Co. 5
The court did not distinguish Klemow, but rather reiterated its conclu-
sion that "adequate notice and opportunity to 'opt-out' would safe-
guard against asserting jurisdiction over a plaintiff who does not wish
to participate."8 6 As to Feldman, the court noted that the defendant in
that case was not connected in any way with the forum state. The de-
fendant in Schlosser, however, was headquartered in the state of Wis-
consin. 87 The court also stated that "[t]o the extent that Feldman may
be on point, we choose not to follow it." '88
The commentators and treatise writers have generally agreed with
the Kansas and Wisconsin courts that a blind application of the "mini-
mum contacts" test to nonresident plaintiffs in a class action contra-
venes the historical purpose and procedural reality of class actions. As
one writer has noted: "[A] focus upon artificial concepts such as 'pres-
ence,' 'minimum contacts,' or a sufficient 'nexus' is distracting. The due
process clause seeks to assure that it is fair for the forum to adjudicate
the interests at issue in a particular suit." 89 The commentators, like the
Shutts and Schlosser courts, have found that due process rights of non-
resident plaintiffs are satisfied by adequate notice and adequate repre-
sentation, the cornerstones of procedural due process. For example, in
83. Id. at 241-42, 271 N.W.2d at 886-87, citing Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 222 Kan.
527, 540-42, 567 P.2d 1292, 1304-07 (1977).
84. See note 66 supra.
85. Id.
86. 86 Wis. 2d at 242, 271 N.W.2d at 887.
87. Id.
88. Id. The court also noted that Professor Moore and the reporters for the American Law
Institute Restatement of Judgments and a tentative draft of the Restatement (Second) all agree
that an otherwise valid judgment obtained in a class action has binding effect as to all members of
the class and beyond the territorial limits of the court's jurisdiction. 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE 23.11(5) (1978); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 26 (1942); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 85 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975).
89. Comment, State Court Jurisdiction Over Class Actions, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1033, 1040 (1978)
(footnote omitted).
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an article that presaged the Kansas court's decision in Shults, one com-
mentator noted:
A class action must necessarily proceed in the absence of almost
every class member. Therefore, ultimately, the residential makeup of
a class is unimportant. What is important is that the rights of the
absent members be justly protected and that the members be given
an opportunity to be heard if they so desire. These are the essential
requirements of due process, and they must be satisfied in any class
action by every court, state or federal, regardless of the residences of
the absent class members. Therefore, whereas the essential element
necessary to establish jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is
some tangible connection between him and the forum state, the ele-
ment necessary to the exercise of jurisdiction over plaintiff classes is
procedural due process. 90
Those courts and writers 9' who espouse the "minimum contacts"
doctrine in plaintiff class actions have claimed support from the
Supreme Court's reiteration of that doctrine in Shaffer v. Heitner:92
"We therefore conclude that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction
must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International
Shoe and its progeny. ' 93 However, in two recent cases which reaffirm
International Shoe, the Supreme Court has apparently limited its reaf-
firmance to exercises of jurisdiction over defendants. In World- Wide
Volkswagen v. Woodson ,94 the Court wrote:
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the
power of a state court to render a valid personal judgment against a
nonresident defendant. Due process requires that the defendant be
iven adequate notice of the suit, . . and be subject to the personaljurisdiction of the court. . . .As has long been settled, and as we
reaffirm today, a state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant only so long as there exist "minimum con-
tacts" between the defendant and the forum State. .. .95
In Rush v. Savchuk,96 the Court not only limited its holding to defend-
ants, but explained exactly what it meant by the oft-quoted language
from Shaffer:
In Shaffer v. Heitner we held that all assertions of state-court juris-
diction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in In-
ternational Shoe and its progeny. . . . That is, a State may exercise
90. Comment, Consumer Class Actions with a Multistate Class: A Problem of Jurisdiction, 25
HASTINGS L.J. 1411, 1432 (1974).
91. See, e.g., Comment, Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions.- Jurisdiction and Certification, 92
HARV. L. REV. 718, 720 (1979).
92. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
93. Id. at 212 (emphasis added).
94. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
95. Id. at 291 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
96. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
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jurisdiction over an absent defendant only if the defendant has certain
minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend traditional notions offair play and substantial jus-
tice 97
The "minimum contacts" doctrine, therefore, although time-tested
and convenient to apply, does not rest comfortably in the context of
plaintiff class actions. As one writer noted: "[I]f a state court, con-
fronted by a multistate class, mechanically refused to exercise jurisdic-
tion beyond its territorial boundaries, such a refusal would be an
abrogation of its duty as an administrator of justice." 98 Instead ofterri-
toriality, due process requires a court to scrutinize the adequacy of no-
tice and adequacy of representation of absent class members when
confronted with a multistate plaintiff class. The constitutional guaran-
tees of adequate notice and representation have been firmly incorpo-
rated into the Illinois class action statute. 99 Due process, therefore,
does not impose any greater obstacle to multistate class actions than
that already imposed by the legislature to protect the interest of all ab-
sentee plaintiffs, regardless of their states of residence.
THE BINDING EFFECT OF A JUDGMENT IN A MULTISTATE CLASS
ACTION: RES JUDICATA
The Spirek and Miner courts were rightly concerned with the
binding effect of an Illinois judgment on nonresident plaintiffs absent
the protection of due process. Neither court, however, recognized the
distinction between the binding effect of an adverse judgment against a
defendant and a judgment adverse to a plaintiff class. The binding ef-
fect of a judgment on a defendant is coercive in nature, necessarily de-
priving a defendant of a liberty or property right recognized by the
Constitution and deemed protected by the due process clause.'°° The
binding effect of a judgment entered against a plaintiff class is res judi-
cata, and could, at worst, deny an individual member of the class "ac-
cess to a court to relitigate a claim previously tried in a class suit in
which that person was a member of the plaintiff class."'' The
Supreme Court has never recognized the right to bring an action one-
self as a liberty or property right 0 2 and has long ago found that reme-
97. Id. at 327 (emphasis added, citation omitted).
98. See Comment, Consumer Class Actions with a Multistate Class- A Problem of Jurisdiction,
25 HASTINGs L. REV. 1411, 1437 (1974).
99. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 57.2(a), 57.4-57.5 (1979).
100. See generally Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-76 (1975).
101. Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1404 (1976).
102. Id. at 1404 n.73.
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dies afforded by a class action can provide constitutionally sufficient
alternative protection of an individual's underlying substantive
claim. ' 03
The res judicata impact of an adverse judgment on absentee mem-
bers of a plaintiff class is limited. An adverse judgment would not nec-
essarily bar all the claims of an absentee member, but simply prevent
the absentee member from relitigating the issues actually decided in the
prior class proceeding. Even then, as already noted, the impact of res
judicata would be felt only after the absentee had an opportunity for
collateral attack in the court of his or her choice.' 04 Professor James
Starrs who, with some justification, has referred to Illinois courts as
suffering from "due-process-phobia" in class action cases, addressed
the issue of res judicata as it relates to absentee members of a plaintiff
class: 105
Occasionally, the courts have suffered from an anxiety neurosis stem-
ming from their concern lest they approve a class action and violate
due process. . . . Nevertheless, its dangers should not be exagger-
ated. It is possible, for example, to avoid the due-process dilemma by
giving notice of the pendency of the suit to all absentees ...
Moreover, the due-process issue is too often linked to the res
judicata impact upon absentees of a judgment in a class action. It is
premature to decide the issue of resjudicata at the commencement of
a class action. That issue might better be resolved later "if the judg-
ment is thereafter collaterally attacked by an absent party [when] a
more careful scrutiny of its representative character may be made in
determining whether it is resjudicata."'06
Even if the right to bring an individual action is some kind of lib-
erty or property right that may be jeopardized by the res judicata effect
of an Illinois judgment and must, therefore, be protected by due pro-
cess, it should be recognized that the due process protections that must
be afforded a nonresident plaintiff need not be as comprehensive as
those that must be afforded a nonresident defendant. As the Supreme
Court noted, "[i]t has been said so often by this Court and others as not
to require citation of authority that due process is flexible and calls for
such procedural protections the particular situation demands."'' 0 7 It is
the coercive effect of a judgment entered against a defendant that re-
103. See Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U.S. 516, 532 (1907) (representation by corporation in
defendant class action sufficient protection of a shareholder's rights).
104. See Comment, Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions: Jurisdiction and Certiocation, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 718, 727 (1979).
105. Starrs, The Consumer Class Action--Fart 1, 49 B.U. L. REV. 407, 441-43 (1969).
106. Id. at 442-43, quoting Darr v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 706, 433 P.2d 732, 740, 63
Cal. Rptr. 724, 732 (1967) (holding in favor of a multistate class action).
107. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
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quires a defendant's minimum contacts with the forum entering the
judgment in order to satisfy the "fundamental fairness" demanded by
the due process clause. The res judicata effect of an adverse judgment
against a plaintiff class simply does not have the same coercive effect
against an individual member of a class. Thus, notions of residence
and territoriality, which gave rise to the "minimum contacts" test for
protection of absent defendants, have no application to the protection
of absent plaintiffs who are already protected by notice of a right to be
heard, a right to withdraw and adequate representation.
Even opponents of multistate class actions admit that both nonres-
ident plaintiffs and nonresident defendants who affirmatively consent
to the jurisdiction of a state court may have their rights validly adjudi-
cated by that court. '0 8 There is no dispute that an "opt-in" notice pro-
cedure, by which a prospective class member returns a notice indicating
to the court that he or she desires to be included in a class action, would
sanctify a multistate class action. Pragmatically, there is no difference
between an "opt-in" procedure and the widely favored "opt-out" pro-
cedure as a device to protect the due process rights of an individual.
Federal courts have rightfully observed that "opt-in" type notice does
not as satisfactorily protect the rights of small claimants as does the
typical "opt-out" notice. 10 9 The Manual for Complex Litigation sug-
gests that a requirement of an "opt-in" notice would be an abuse of a
trial court's discretion under the federal rules, particularly in a class
action comprised of small claimants." 0
A federal court has no greater in personam jurisdiction than the
courts of the state in which it sits."'I Nevertheless, federal courts find
the "opt-out" provisions of the federal class action rule,"I2 which are
similar in language and equal in scope to the Illinois class action stat-
ute, sufficient to protect nonresident members of a plaintiff class. In
Appleton Electric Co. v. Advance- United Expressways,' 3 for example,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that an
option to withdraw and adequate representation of interests afford suf-
108. See, e.g., Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 86 Wis. 2d 226, 243, 271 N.W.2d 879, 887
(1978).
109. See, e.g., Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 340 (7th Cir. 1974); Korn v.
Franchard Corp., 50 F.R.D. 57, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'don other grounds, 456 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir.
1972).
110. i MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.45 (1979).
111. See Royal Lace Paper Works v. Pest-Guard Prods., Inc., 240 F.2d 814, 816 (5th Cir.
1957).
112. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
113. 494 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1974).
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ficient due process protection to nonresident class members. 114
In addition to due process problems, the Miner court found that
"any determination made by an Illinois court would have no binding
effect beyond the jurisdiction of the Illinois courts and would be subject
to relitigation in other jurisdictions whenever difficulty arose in enforc-
ing the judgment in sister states' courts." 1 5 Stated differently, the
Miner court expressed doubt that any judgment rendered which af-
fected nonresident members of a multistate plaintiff class would be
granted full faith and credit by the courts of sister states.
This fear of overstepping jurisdictional bounds by entertaining a
multistate class action, however, can be alleviated by looking to cases
in which a judgment rendered in favor or against a multistate class was
brought for enforcement in a court of a sister state. It is in the context
of full faith and credit that the United States Supreme Court and the
Supreme Court of Illinois each addressed the propriety of multistate
plaintiff classes.
In Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble,116 for example, the United
States Supreme Court allowed a class action brought in federal court
on behalf of persons who "resided in many different States of the
Union," and held that the judgment rendered therein was binding on
all members.' ' 7 The Court noted: "That a class suit of this nature
might have been maintained in a state court, and would have been
binding on all of the class, we can have no doubt." "1 8 Similarly, in Hart-
ford Life Insurance Co. v. Jbs," 1 9 a multistate class action of 12,000 pol-
icyholders was brought in a Connecticut state court and resulted in a
favorable judgment for the class. An unnamed member of the class
from Minnesota challenged the judgment in a court of her own state
and asserted that a state court in a class action has no jurisdiction over
and cannot bind nonresidents. The United States Supreme Court re-
jected her argument, holding that the Connecticut court had jurisdic-
tion over the nonresident members of the class and that the courts of
sister states must give full faith and credit to the Connecticut judg-
ment.120 The Supreme Court of Illinois has followed this lead and has
held that Illinois residents who were neither personally served nor per-
114. Id. at 140.
115. 89 111. App. 3d at 319, 411 N.E.2d at 1096.
116. 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
117. Id. at 364.
118. Id. at 366 (emphasis added).
119. 237 U.S. 662, 671-74 (1915).
120. See also Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66 (1938); Hartford Life
Ins. Co. v. Barber, 245 U.S. 146 (1917).
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sonally before a state court in California were bound by the judgment
entered in the California class action by the "doctrine of class represen-
tation." 121
Absent territorial considerations, which, as discussed above, play
no viable role in determining the due process protections of a nonresi-
dent member of a multistate class, there is no reason why an Illinois
court should fear that its judgment would be invalid outside its state's
boundaries. So long as adequate notice, an opportunity to withdraw,
intervene or otherwise assert one's status as a party or non-party in the
action and adequate representation are provided by the forum, full
faith and credit in sister states is assured. Where, as in Illinois, the
statutory procedures for bringing a class action protect these interests
of an absent member of the class at every stage of the proceeding, it is
both unnatural and unnecessary to impose territorial doctrines to
plaintiff class membership that have been historically developed to pro-
tect the interests of defendants alone.
MULTISTATE CLASS ACTIONS UNDER THE ILLINOIS
CLASS ACTION STATUTE
Until 1977, Illinois was one of seven states that had neither statute
nor procedural rule to govern class actions. 122 Illinois courts relied ex-
clusively on the common law to determine the propriety of a class ac-
tion. 123 The common law, however, was sharply divided as to the
prerequisites of a class action and was substantially confusing to courts
and practitioners alike. For example, decisions of the Illinois Supreme
Court varied from time to time on whether multiple claims for dam-
ages in varying amounts which would have to be separately adjudi-
cated would preclude class treatment. 124 Other common law doctrines,
such as the "community of interest" test, 125 gave trial courts little or no
guidance as to the requirements for the maintenance of a class ac-
tion.126 With the advent of the Illinois class action statute, class actions
in Illinois were streamlined significantly and made a more "potent pro-
121. See Larson v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 373 I11. 614,27 N.E.2d 458, cert. denied, 311 U.S.
698 (1940).
122. See Comment, Illinois:. A Common LawApproach, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 1094 (1974).
123. Id.
124. Compare Newberry Library v. Board of Educ., 387 Ill. 85, 55 N.E.2d 147 (1944); Peoples
Store of Roseland v. McKibbin, 379 Ill. 148, 39 N.E.2d 995 (1942), with Fiorito v. Jones, 39 111. 2d
531, 236 N.E.2d 698 (1968); Harrison Sheet Steel Co. v. Lyons, 15 I11. 2d 332, 155 N.E.2d 595
(1959). See generally Gaffney v. Shell Oil Co., 19 I11. App. 3d 987, 989-90, 312 N.E.2d 753, 756
(1974).
125. See note 8 supra.
126. Moseid v. McDonough, 103 I11. App. 2d 23, 27-28, 243 N.E.2d 394, 396 (1968).
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cedural vehicle" to resolve the typically small claims of injured con-
sumers. 127
The Illinois class action statute established four prerequisites for
class treatment. Simply stated, a class representative must show: (1)
that the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracti-
cable; (2) that common questions of law or fact predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members; (3) that the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class; and
(4) that the class action is an appropriate method for the fair and effi-
cient adjudication of the controversy. 128
As noted above, Spirek v. State Farm MutualAutomobile Insurance
Co. 129 and Miner v. Gillette Co. 130 both found support in the Illinois
class action statute for denial of a multistate class. Specifically, both
courts expressed doubt that the second and third prerequisites under
the statute, predominance of a common question of law or fact and
adequate representation, could ever be met in a multistate class action.
Apart from those decisions, there is little reason to believe that the
new Illinois class action statute inhibits multistate class actions. Quite
the contrary, the provisions of the new statute, particularly the require-
ments of notice, an opportunity to withdraw and adequate representa-
tion, obviate the due process analysis in which the Spirek and Miner
courts engaged. Moreover, the comprehensive procedure outlined by
the new statute provides an ease of administration that is necessary to
the maintenance of a multistate class action. Because it is incumbent
on a trial court faced with a class action to apply each of the four pre-
requisites to the facts of the particular case, 13 1 each of the four prereq-
uisites is analyzed below in the context of a multistate class action.
Section 57 2(a)(1).: Numerosity
The question of whether a class is so numerous that joinder of
each individual member would be impracticable is, for practical rea-
sons, rarely litigated. 32 Generally, one would not bring a class action
where there was not a substantial number of similarly situated claim-
127. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 69 IlL. 2d 320, 334, 371 N.E.2d 634, 641
(1977).
128. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 57.2(a)(1-4) (1979).
129. See note 32 supra.
130. See note 20 supra.
131. See, e.g., McCabe v. Burgess, 75 I11. 2d 457, 389 N.E.2d 565 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
916 (1980).
132. K. FORDE, STATE PRACTICE, ILLINOIS CLASS ACTION STATUTE, ICCLE CLASS ACTIONS
(1979).
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In the context of a multistate class action, the issue of numerosity
should never arise. 34 Indeed, one obvious purpose for including non-
residents in a plaintiff class is to increase the size of the class. As the
class increases in size, the costs of litigation attributable to each mem-
ber of a successful plaintiff class is reduced. Thus, attorney's fees and
court costs, which are generally subtracted from a judgment for dam-
ages in favor of a plaintiff class, become less for each member of the
class.
Rather than preclude a multistate class, the numerosity require-
ment of the class action statute should militate in favor of a multistate
class. It is conceivable that a class comprised solely of Illinois residents
may be too small for class treatment, where the addition of nonresi-
dents would satisfy the numerosity requirement. In such a case, partic-
ularly where the potential individual recovery is minimal, Illinois
residents could be deprived of a meaningful forum in which to protect
their interests unless a multistate class is certified. On the other hand,
the sheer size of a multistate class may render it unmanageable, at least
where the location and identity of the individual members is un-
known. 135
Section 572(a)(2).- Predominance of Common Questions of
Law or Fact
Although the Spirek court allowed the plaintiffs to proceed on be-
half of the Illinois members of the class, the court rejected the multi-
state class in part on its finding that the case presented no common
question of law among the nonresident members of the class:
Accordingly, because the plaintiffs in the case at hand come from
numerous other states, numerous other states' laws would have to be
applied. Thus, as to nonresident members of the proposed class, the
question of law which is the heart of this action would not be in
common, and would not predominate, as required by Section
57.2(a)(2) of the Civil Practice Act.136
Spirek was a "common question of law" case and presented no
common question of fact among either the nonresident or the Illinois
resident members. It was on the basis of the common question of law
alone that the appellate court allowed the class to proceed comprised
133. But see Board of Educ. v. Pomeroy, 47 Ill. App. 3d 468, 473, 362 N.E.2d 55, 59 (1977).
134. See, e.g., Miner v. Gillette Co., 89 [l. App. 3d 315, 320, 411 N.E.2d 1092, 1096 (1980).
135. See, e.g., Reardon v. Ford Motor Co., 7 I11. App. 3d 338, 287 N.E.2d 519 (1972).
136. 65 I11. App. 3d at 453-54, 382 N.E.2d at 121.
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solely of Illinois residents. However, the plaintiff in Spirek had diffi-
culty establishing a common question of law among the nonresident
members of her class. The substantive law of that case varied exten-
sively from state to state and the plaintiff was already facing an adverse
decision, arising out of the same nucleus of facts, in California. 137
In contrast, the class claims in Miner presented "a common ques-
tion of fact [which] predominate[d] over any question affecting only
individual members, and as to Illinois residents, a common question of
law predominate[d] also."' 138 Nevertheless, the Miner court concluded
that no common question of law predominated as to nonresidents "and
to allow this action to proceed as a multistate class action would entail
the application of the laws of the different states."'1 39
The fault with the Spirek and Miner analysis of the "predomi-
nance" questions emanates from an overly restrictive reading of section
57.2(a)(2). Under this section, a class action would be proper if "[tihere
are questions of fact or law common to the class, which common ques-
tions predominate over any questions affecting only individual mem-
bers.' 40 As noted by the late Justice Dooley in Steinberg v. Chicago
Medical School, "[s]o long as there are questions of fact or law com-
mon to the class, and these predominate over questions affecting only
individual members of such class, the statutory requisite is met."'' 4'
Thus, the clear language of the class action statute, and the lan-
guage as interpreted by the Illinois Supreme Court, requires a trial
court to look to both questions of fact and law to determine whether
either would predominate over questions affecting only individual
members of the plaintiff class. 142 A blind application of the Spirek ra-
137. Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 14, Spirek v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65
I11. App. 3d 440, 382 N.E.2d 111 (1978).
138. 89 I11. App. 3d at 319, 411 N.E.2d at 1096.
139. Id.
140. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 57.2(a)(2) (1979) (emphasis added).
141. 69 Ill. 2d 320, 328, 371 N.E.2d 634, 639 (1977) (emphasis added).
142. It is interesting to note that the Kansas class action statute, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-223,
upon which the Supreme Court of Kansas relied to certify a multistate class in Shutts v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 222 Kan. 527, 567 P.2d 1292 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1068 (1978), contains
language almost identical to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 57.2(a)(2) and (4). The Kansas class
action statute provides in pertinant part:
[An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are
satisfied [requiring: (I) numerosity; (2) common questions of law or fact; (3) typicality of
claims; and (4) fair and adequate representation], and in addition:
[Tihe court finds that the questions of law orfac! common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action
is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the con-
troversy.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-223(b)(3) (1980) (emphasis added).
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tionale, however, would have a trial court cease its inquiry once it finds
that a common question of law does not predominate. Spirek would
redraft section 57.2(a)(2) to require both a common question of fact
and law to predominate over "any questions affecting only individual
members" of a class and harken back to the old "community of inter-
est" standard rejected in Steinberg.
Moreover, the analysis applied by the Appellate Court for the
First Judicial District in Spirek and Miner seems to be at odds with an
earlier pronouncement of that court. In Brooks v. Midas-International
Corp. ,'143 Justice Linn expressed the bottom line of any inquiry under
section 57.2(a)(2): "A class action can properly be prosecuted where a
defendant is alleged to have acted wrongfully in the same basic manner
to an entire class. In such circumstances, the common class questions
. . . dominate the case."' 44
There is no denying that the potential application of sister states'
laws by an Illinois court presents problems that do not usually arise in
a class action restricted to Illinois residents. These problems, however,
are neither overwhelming nor insurmountable. Like Miner, a typical
consumer class action brought in an Illinois state court would rely on
theories based on the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act and common law remedies for breach of contract. A the-
ory of common law fraud is difficult to treat in a class manner because
of the potential for individual questions of actual reliance. 145 The
Consumer Fraud Act, on the other hand, simply requires proof that a
misrepresentation or concealment be made "with intent that others
rely."' 146 Because individual proofs of reliance need not be made, the
143. 47 Ill. App. 3d 266, 361 N.E.2d 815 (1977).
144. Id. at 273, 361 N.E.2d at 820.
145. See, e.g., Edelman v. Lee Optical Co., 24 111. App. 3d 216, 320 N.E.2d 517 (1974).
146. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, § 262 (1979). See Brooks v. Midas Int'l Corp., 47 I11. App. 3d
266, 361 N.E.2d 815 (1977), where the court wrote:
Defendant asserts that a class action may not be maintained since the element of reliance
is a question which is individual to each class member and thus defeats class action
status. Defendant's contention is based upon the argument that different customers
would have individual reactions to defendant's advertising and that some may have re-
lied on the advertising while others may not have seen it at all. Under the common law
reliance was an element which had to be alleged in order to constitute a valid cause of
action for misrepresentation or deceit. However, the language employed in the Con-
sumer Fraud Act clearly indicates that it is the intent of the defendant in his conduct, not
the reliance or belief of the plaintiff, which is the pivotal point upon which an action
arises. Section 2 of the Act specifically provides that the question of whether a person
has been misled, deceived or damaged is not an element of an action brought under the
Act. If, after trial, it is found that defendant did engage in an unlawful practice in its
advertising, then the question common to all class members has been established in favor
of plaintiffs.
Id. at 272-73, 361 N.E.2d at 819-20 (emphasis added, citation omitted).
420
MULTISTATE CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS
Consumer Fraud Act and similar laws provide ideal substantive law
for class treatment. In Miner, the plaintiff argued that each state of the
union, with the exception of Alabama, has legislation, similar in scope
to the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, that would have reached the al-
leged conduct of the defendant in that case. 47 Miner also argued that
under the facts of his case his common law contract theory was the
same in each of the fifty states. The appellate court made no inquiry
into the similarity of consumer fraud and contract laws among the
states. The failure to make such an inquiry is, in effect, a mandate to
the trial courts facing multistate class actions that there could never be
a common question of law when the laws of other states must be con-
sidered. In short, both the Miner and the Spirek courts implied that
substantially similar questions of law could never amount to common
questions of law under the statute.
It is important to note that these rulings take the threshold ques-
tion of commonality out of the hands of the trial courts. However, in
Steinberg148 and, more recently, in McCabe v. Burgess, 14 9 the Illinois
Supreme Court implied that such determinations are to be made by
trial courts on a case-by-case basis. Where a plaintiff can establish
before the trial court that the laws of the states in which nonresident
class members reside are the same in scope as the Illinois law under
147. See generally FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, FACT SHEET: STATE LEGISLATION TO
COMBAT UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES (revised Sept. 1979). See also ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471
(1980); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 70-901 (1980); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1980);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-101 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-1 10a (West 1978); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 2511 (1980); D.C. CODE ANN. tit. 28, Appendix, § 1 (1973 & Supp. V 1978); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 501.201 (West 1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 106-1201 (1980); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 481A (1979); IDAHO CODE § 48-601 (1977); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 , § 261 (1979); IND. CODE
ANN. § 24-5-0.50-3 (Burns 1980); IOWA CODE ANN. § 714.16 (West 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-
623 (1979); Ky. REV. STAT. § 367.110 (1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1401 (West 1980); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 206 (1980); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 13-101 (1980); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 1 (West 1980); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.901 (1980); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 325.79 (West 1980); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-1 (1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.010
(Vernon 1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 85-401 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-1601 (1979);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 598-360 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:I (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 56:8-1 (West 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-15-1 (1978); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 350 (McKinney
1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-15-01 (1979); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1345.01 (Page 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 751 (West 1980); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 646.605 (1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201 (Purdon 1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-I (1980);
S.C. CODE § 39-5-10 (1980); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 37-24-1 (1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-
18-101 (1979); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 17.41 (Vernon 1979); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 13-11-1 (1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2451a (1980); VA. CODE § 59.1-196 (1980); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 19.86.010 (1979); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-101 (1980); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.18
(West 1980); Wyo. STAT. § 40-12-101 (1977).
148. 69 11. 2d at 342, 371 N.E.2d at 645.
149. 75 11. 2d 457, 389 N.E.2d 565 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 916 (1980).
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which the plaintiff seeks relief, there is no reason to find that a common
question of law is not established.
Moreover, there are methods available to a court, other than the
application of the law of fifty states, to resolve the potential application
of law problems raised by a multistate class action. For example, when
it was faced with a multistate class action brought under a breach of
contract theory in Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers Corp. 150 the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin applied the "grouping of contracts" approach to
determine which state's law would best serve to resolve the contracts
question. Under the "grouping of contracts" approach, the law of the
state with which the contract has its most significant relationship is ap-
plied. The Wisconsin court applied Wisconsin law to all contracts
with the Wisconsin defendant.
The "grouping of contracts" approach to similar choice of law
problems is not at all foreign to Illinois.' 5' Illinois courts have long
been equipped to apply the law of a foreign jurisdiction. In 1939, the
legislature enacted the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act 52
which allows the trial courts of Illinois to take judicial notice of the
common law and statutes of every state, territory, and other jurisdiction
of the United States. Thus, in Miner, for example, both the "grouping
of contracts" approach and the Foreign Law Act could have been uti-
lized to apply the law of Massachusetts, the defendant's headquarter
state, to the claims of all class members, Illinois residents and nonresi-
dents alike.
In summary, the possibility of applying the laws of different states
in a multistate class action does not necessarily defeat the prerequisite
of section 57.2(a)(2). This is particularly true where there are predomi-
nating common questions of fact, such as in Miner. In addition, courts
faced with multistate class actions can be flexible in applying swiftly
developing choice of law doctrines to avoid the application of fifty dif-
ferent laws altogether.
Section 57 2(a)(3).: Adequate Representation
In the context of multistate class actions, both the Spirek and
Miner courts analyzed adequacy of representation with similar con-
cerns as the problem of commonality among legal issues. In Spirek, the
court refused to assert jurisdiction over a multistate class action be-
150. See note 57 supra.
151. See Oakes v. Chicago Fire Brick Co., 388 111. 474, 479, 58 N.E.2d 460, 462 (1944).
152. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, §§ 48a-48n (1979).
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cause, among other reasons, "the need for plaintiffs counsel to argue
the law of numerous other states would make it impractical for them to
adequately represent all members of the proposed class."' 153 In Miner,
the court took note of the "difficulty" that an Illinois plaintiff may have
"in adequately representing the interests of all the purported class
members."1 54
The fault with these conclusions lies not with the courts' consider-
ation of a prerequisite under section 57.2(a)(2) to preclude the respec-
tive plaintiffs from meeting the prerequisite of section 57.2(a)(3). As the
court noted, "the several aspects of class actions cannot be neatly com-
partmentalized and independently resolved."' 155 A substantial conflict
among the laws to be applied to individual members or subclasses of a
plaintiff class can undermine the adequacy of a particular plaintiffs
representation. It was not, however, the potential for such conflict that
concerned the courts in Spirek and Miner, but rather the potential for
complex legal problems in applying the laws of different states. This
concern, and the analysis derived therefrom, is a departure from the
standards traditionally applied to the question of adequacy of represen-
tation.
Neither Spirek nor Miner held without qualification that represen-
tation by an Illinois plaintiff would necessarily be inadequate to protect
the interests of nonresident class members. Spirek simply stated that
such representation would be "impractical," 56 while the Miner court
found it to be "difficult." 157 There was, however, no explanation of
how impracticality or difficulty precludes adequate representation. The
courts' determinations in this respect seemingly usurp much of the dis-
cretion of the trial court.
In neither Spirek nor Miner was there any mention of a trial court
determination that laws of sister states differed to such a degree that the
respective lawsuits would be too complex for chancery courts to enter-
tain. Because both cases arose from motions to dismiss and not from
motions to certify a class, there was no evidentiary record nor finding
of facts upon which an appellate court could hold that multistate repre-
sentation would be inordinately complex. In this respect, the rather
broad conclusions of Spirek and Miner are contrary to the policy of
153. 65 I1. App. 3d at 454, 382 N.E.2d at 121.
154. 89 111. App. 3d at 319, 411 N.E.2d at 1096.
155. Frank v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am., 71 111. 2d 583, 592, 376 N.E.2d 1377,
1380 (1978).
156. 65 Il1. App. 3d at 454, 382 N.E.2d at 121.
157. See note 154 supra.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
trial courts applying the statutory prerequisites on a case by case ba-
sis.'
58
Spirek and Miner also deviated from the traditional analysis of
adequacy of representation by focusing on the role of the plaintiffs'
counsel rather than the interests of the representative plaintiff. As Ke-
vin M. Forde pointed out in his article leading to the enactment of the
Illinois class action statute, "the determination [of whether representa-
tion is adequate] involves a consideration of whether the representative
interests are compatible with, and not antagonistic to, those of the class
and whether the representative parties will put up a real fight."' 59 In
essence, adequacy of representation is established when it can be
shown that the named plaintiffs share a common interest in proving
the essential elements sought to be litigated on behalf of the class. 160
Therefore, so long as the essential elements of the representative plain-
tiff's claims are the same as those to be established under the law of a
nonresident's state, the representative plaintiff should be able to ade-
quately protect the interests of the nonresident class member.
The interest of a class representative in increasing the size of his or
her class by joining nonresidents as class members is obvious and has
already been noted. In neither Spirek nor Miner did the appellate
court weigh the interests of a plaintiff reducing his or herpro rata share
of costs against the apparent interests of the courts in avoiding complex
lawsuits. Indeed, it was simply the potential complexity of legal issues
that caused those courts to doubt the adequacy of the plaintiffs' repre-
sentation of nonresident members. In this respect, Spirek and Miner
stand apart from any other case decided under section 57.2(a)(3). In no
other case was jurisdiction denied simply because a legal issue was too
complex. As stated by the Fifth District: "[W]e find absolutely no au-
thority to thwart a class action merely because a complete resolution of
the dispute requires examination of a sister state's law as well as our
own."161
The question of adequacy of representation is a question best left
to the trial court facing a multistate class action. Like any element of
class certification, the burden should be placed on the representative
plaintiff to show that he or she can adequately represent the interests
158. See note 131 supra.
159. Forde, Class Actions in Illinois.- Towards a More Attractive Forumfor this Essential Rem-
edy, 26 DEPAUL L. REV. 211, 217 (1977). See also State Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Educ., 394 111.
301, 68 N.E.2d 525 (1946).
160. Smyth v. Kaspar Am. State Bank, 9 111. 2d 27, 136 N.E.2d 796 (1956).
161. Hoover v. May Dep't Stores Co., 62 I11. App. 3d 106, 115, 378 N.E.2d 762, 770 (1978).
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of nonresident members despite the application of law of the different
states. One must also remember that trial courts can deal with the
problem of different states' laws with a great degree of flexibility. For
example, residents of states in which the law is fatally different from
the law under which the representative seeks relief can be dismissed
from the case, or, if circumstances permit, relegated to subclasses with-
out seriously disturbing the class action. Again, the "difficulty" of ap-
plying the law of fifty states can be surmounted with an appropriate
choice of law method that would provide for the application of the law
of one state.
Section 57 2(a)(4).: Appropriateness of a Class Action
Section 57.2(a)(4), which requires that a trial court find a class ac-
tion to be an appropriate method for adjudication of the substantive
claim, focuses on the questions of manageability, practicality and effi-
ciency. The Illinois prerequisite differs from that of the federal rule,
under which a court must find that a class action would be superior to
other available methods of adjudication. 162 In Steinberg, the Illinois
Supreme Court stated that meeting the first three prerequisites
"make[s] manifest that the final requirement of the statute . . . is ful-
filled." 16 3
There is nothing about a multistate class action that makes it in-
trinsically more unmanageable or impractical than any other class ac-
tion comprised wholly of resident plaintiffs. As discussed above, 164the
economy of scale favors a class action that settles as many potential
claims as possible. Thus, the purpose of a class action as a device to
settle numerous controversies while conserving judicial resources is en-
hanced when all claimants are joined in the class. When determining
the manageability of a class action, the key inquiry usually revolves
around the problem of notice and disbursement of damages. 165 Where
the identity and location of the individual class members is known,
such as in Miner, the nonresident location of certain class members
should make little difference.
In Spirek and Miner the focus of the inquiry under section
57.2(a)(4) was not restricted to the problems faced by the particular
trial courts before which the class actions were brought. Rather, both
courts were concerned that judicial effort would be wasted if Illinois
162. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
163. 69 Il. 2d at 339, 371 N.E.2d at 644.
164. See text accompanying notes 153-161 supra.
165. See Reardon v. Ford Motor Co., 7 Ill. App. 3d 338, 287 N.E.2d 519 (1972).
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judgments could be collaterally attacked in the courts of sister states. 166
This concern, however, was reached without any discussion of the fact
that such judgments should be granted full faith and credit. 167 As dis-
cussed above, so long as due process has been satisfied through notice,
an opportunity to withdraw and adequate representation, sister states
could have no cognizable objection to a decision by the court of an-
other state affecting citizens of their state. Indeed, if any of these due
process requirements is disregarded in even a single state class action, a
class judgment is subject to collateral attack by a class member in the
courts of that same state.
When considering the manageability and practicality of a particu-
lar class action, one must always balance burdens imposed by a class
action with the factors in favor of a class. Both the members of a plain-
tiff class and the defendant in a class action share an interest in resolv-
ing a multitude of controversies in one action before one forum. It is
this interest that gave rise to the class action as a procedural device in
the first place. The federal system attempts to meet this interest
through its rules on multidistrict litigation. 68 The simple fact that
prosecution of a multistate class action is potentially more difficult for
courts and attorneys and judges than an action restricted to one state
should not preclude a multistate class action altogether: "It is obvious
• ..that the only manner in which the plaintiff class can ever prosecute
their claims is by a. . . class action and the Court cannot simply close
the doors to these litigants because their actions present novel and diffi-
cult questions."' 169
CONCLUSION
With the enactments of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Busi-
ness Practices Act and the Illinois class action statute, the state of Illi-
nois has issued a stern warning to manufacturers, distributors, services
and retailers who bring their business into this state to refrain from
fraud, unfair competition and otherwise unfair or deceptive conduct.
So far, the courts of Illinois have utilized this legislation to inhibit such
conduct and to make Illinois a better place for consumers and busi-
nesses alike. Although Illinois courts have greeted the new class action
166. 65 Ill. App. 3d at 454, 382 N.E.2d at 121; 89 Ill. App. 3d at 319, 411 N.E.2d at 1096.
167. See text accompanying notes 115-121 supra.
168. See Peterson & McDermott, Mulidistrict Litigation: New Forms of Judicial Administra-
ion, 56 A.B.A. J. 737 (1970).
169. In Re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, [1971] TRADE
REG. REP (CCH) (Trade Cas.) 73,699, at 90,915 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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statute as a sound procedural basis for consumer protection, the Appel-
late Court for the First Judicial District, the district in which most con-
sumer class actions are brought in this state, has balked at enhancing
the class action device by allowing a multistate class.
A court serves the ends of justice when it provides an expedient
and inexpensive forum for one resolution of multiple claims. Histori-
cally, these ends have not been restrained by territorial boundaries.
Those courts which restrict their jurisdiction over multistate plaintiff
classes by applying a "minimum contacts" standard fail to recognize
that the standard was developed to protect defendants from the sub-
stantive burden and expense of resisting a claim in a distant and con-
ceivably hostile forum. The extension of the "minimum contacts"
doctrine to plaintiff classes, however, throws the substantive baby out
of court with the procedural bathwater. The nonresident plaintiff who
is excluded by an Illinois court presiding over a class action incurs the
burden and expense of bringing his own lawsuit or suffering the injury
that may be remedied only for Illinois residents. In an effort to protect
nonresidents from an overextension of its powers, the court that sum-
marily rejects a multistate class on the basis of "minimum contacts"
robs those persons of an effective forum. In addition, the court
foresakes the interests of the residents of its own state, who seek the
most expedient and inexpensive resolution of their claims possible.
Due process does not forbid a multistate class action where the
courts of the forum state are statutorily bound to protect the interests of
absentee class members. Due process calls for "fundamental fairness,"
which, in the context of a plaintiff class action, requires notice, an op-
portunity to withdraw and adequate representation. Given the under-
lying notions of fundamental fairness in due process and full faith and
credit considerations, it is indeed ironic that the interests of Illinois
consumers can be protected through representative actions filed in the
state courts of Kansas, Wisconsin or California, but that Illinois courts
may not reciprocate.
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